Please Sign Our Guestbook Get your own FREE Guestbook from htmlGEAR Please View Our Guestbook

 

Commanding Officers from 7 Jul 1950 to 13 Jul 1953.  
Maj Arnold A. Lund 7 Jul 1950-24 Jan 1951 LtCol Henry S. Miller * 1 Jun 1952-31 Aug 1952
Maj Stanley S. Nicolay 25 Jan 1951-23 Mar 1951 LtCol Kenneth R. Chamberlain 1 Sep 1952-19 Nov 1952
Maj Donald L. Clark * 24 Mar 1951-2 May 1951 LtCol Willard C. Lemke 20 Nov 1952-12 Jan 1953
Maj Charles M. Kunz 3 May 1951-24 Sep 1951 LtCol William M. Frash 13 Jan 1953-10 Apr 1953
LtCol George F. Vaughan 25 Sep 1951-24 Oct 1951 LtCol Clarence H. Moore 11 Apr 1953-26 Jun 1953
Maj John L. Dexter 25 Oct 1951-15 Jan 1952 Maj Robert C. Woren 17 Jun 1953-5 Jul 1953
LtCol Richard L. Blume * 16 Jan 1952-25 Apr 1952 Capt Ted J. Foster 6 Jul 1953-13 Jul 1953
Maj William A. Weir 26 Apr 1952-31 May 1952    
* Marine Corps Reserve Officers.    
     
Prisoners Of War 1950-1953    
Beswick, Byron H. Martelli, Paul L.    
Delacy, Arthur D. Stanfill, Herman F.    

    Early in July 1950, VMF-323 received movement orders to the Western Pacific.  On 7 Jul Maj Arnold A. Lund assumed command of the squadron, relieving Maj Robert E. Johnson, who was then assigned as executive officer.  On 16 Jul 4 officers and 104 enlisted Marines boarded the General A.E. Anderson (AP-111) at Long Beach, Ca.  On 19 Jul 26 officers and 49 enlisted men boarded the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) at San Diego, Ca.  Both ships arrived at Kobe, Japan on 31 July.  On 1 Aug VMF-323’s Corsairs were launched and flew into Itami Air force Base near Osaka.  The F4U’s got a quick check and then flew on to Kobe.  The Death Rattlers base of operations would be the Badoeng Strait.  On 2 Aug VMF-323 personnel on board the Anderson transferred to the Badoeng Strait, the Administration was temporarily stationed at Itami Air force Base.  FCLP traing was conducted at Itami from 2-4 Aug.  On 5 Aug the Death Rattlers flew back aboard the Badoeng Strait.

     VMF-323 began combat operations on 6 Aug 1950 at 0645 when 2 divisions of Corsairs made their first strike in the area west of Chinju along the Nam River.  Rockets and 500-pound general-purpose bombs were used against large buildings and railroad lines.  A second division flight took off at 0935 to the attack area.  2 bridges were hit with 500-pound GPs and several strikes with 5-inch high velocity aerial rockets (HVARs) were made on a railroad round house near Chinju.  The 3rd strike launched at 1235 to attack targets in the town of Singom-ni.

    On 11 Aug, VMF-323 Corsairs and USAF F-51 aircraft combined in what became as the “Kosong Turkey Shoot.”  An estimated 100 vehicles of the 83rd Motorcycle Regiment of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), including jeeps, motorcycles, and several troop-carrying trucks, were attacked.  Virtually all the vehicles were destroyed or damaged.  Captain Vivian M. Moses became the first combat fatality for the Death Rattlers in the Korean War.  His Corsair was shot down by small-arms fire.  Ironically, Captain Moses had been shot down the day before and was picked up by a Marine helicopter and retuned to the Badoeng Strait that morning.  On 13 Aug the Badoeng Strait pulled into the harbor at Sasebo, Japan, for replenishment.  On 14 Aug the ship headed back to the operation area. There was no time for liberty this trip.

     During 17-19 Aug the Death Rattlers, along with pilots from VMF-214, flew a total of 135 sorties, 129 of which were directed by Marine tactical air control parties.  The remaining 6 were flown in support of the U.S. Army’s 24th Division.  After 2 days in the Yellow Sea, the Badoeng Strait returned to its original operating area in the Korean Strait.  Strikes continued through 28 Aug and 22 F4U flew to Itami Air Base in Japan.  While approaching the field for landing, First Lieutenant Robert F. Scott was killed when his plane crashed into Osaka Bay.  The Badoeng Strait docked at Sasebo on 29 Aug.    Most of the squadron was immediately given liberty.  On 2 Sep all planes were moved to Ashiya Air force Base on northern Kyushu.  9 sorties were flown from Ashiya against enemy forces.  2 days later, all squadron personnel except 23 pilots departed for Sasebo and boarded the Badoeng Strait.  The carrier put out to sea on 2 Sep and 23 Corsairs flew aboard at noon. 

     On the morning of 6 Sep 1950, the Badoeng Strait was stationed 70 miles west of Inchon.  Flight operations were against bridges, boxcars, tunnels, airfields, artillery installations, and supply depots on that day.   The next days' targets were similar, but napalm was added to the Corsair's ordnance to burn trees and brush that were screening enemy troops and artillery.
    On 10 Sep the "Bing Ding" (nickname for the Badoeng Strait) put into Sasebo for replenishment; then steamed up the west side of the Korean peninsula toward Inchon and the 15 Sep amphibious landing planned by General MacArthur.  D-Day minus 1, several Death Rattlers participated in spotting for 6" and 8" naval gunfire on proposed landing areas, suspected troop concentrations, and any gun emplacements.
    On D-Day, 15 September 1950, planes of VMF-323 were airborne at dawn.   They attacked in the Inchon area, integrating their strikes with naval gunfire for three hours prior to the troop landing.  Death Rattlers provided close air support against North Korean troops who were holding up our advance near the lighthouse on Wolmi-do Island.  4-500# GPs and napalm cleared the way and the attack resumed unimpeded.
    The support given by VMF-323 continued all through D-Day, from before the first wave of landing craft through support of Major General Oliver P Smith's 1st Marine Division securing the beachhead and beginning the move inland.  During that day, the squadron totaled 137.2 combat flight hours.   Within two days of the landing, Seoul's Kimpo Airfield, was captured.
    On 21 Sep the squadron was reassigned to MAG-12 and continued it's close air support (CAS) of the advance of the 1st Marine Division and other UN forces.  2,507.9 hours of flight time were logged between 2 and 22 Sep.   During this time, the squadron suffered neither fatalities nor serious accidents.  By 27 Sep, friendly troops had liberated Seoul.
    2 Oct, forward air controllers called in 323 Corsairs with 500# GPs, rockets and 20mm cannon-fire as close as 200 yards ahead of friendly lines to help take Hill 228.  The Death Rattlers received this radio message, "You have neutralized the ridge and our troops are moving in."
    A major rearming, provisioning and repair stop was needed at Sasebo after the Inchon effort, so the Marines of VMF-323 enjoyed a rest and recreation time in the Itami area until 16 Oct.  During this time, VMF-323 was transferred back to MAG-33; the administrative section joined the squadron on board the ship; then the Badoeng Strait headed up the east coast of Korea.  Because North Korea had refused MacArthur's demand that they surrender, 323’s new operating area was to be out of the port city of Wonsan in North Korea.
    4-plane CAPS were led by Major Lund to cover minesweeping operations in Wonsan Harbor through 27 Oct.  CAS  was provided for the 1st Marines' 26 Oct landing at Wonsan.  1st Lt John L Greene made the 11,000th recorded landing aboard the Badoeng Strait on 2 Nov 1950.
    Although the weather had been freezing, snowing, and blowing like crazy for weeks already, on 13 Nov, it was so bad that flight operations had to be suspended so that all hands could pitch in to clear the deck and catapult apparatus of 3"of ice and snow.  Anything less than that and the Death Rattlers were in the air providing CAS and armed recon for the advancing Republic of Korea (ROK) Capital Division, the US Army's 7th Infantry Division, and the 1st Marines in NE and north central Korea.
    16 to 24 Nov had the Badoeng Strait in Sasebo for replenishment, then back to the Wonsan operating area where flight operations resumed.  Although UN forces didn't realize it at the time, Chinese troops had been crossing the frozen Yalu River on their border with North Korea for days, and on 27 Nov, attacked the 1st Marine Division at the Chosin Reservoir.  
    Death Rattlers provided dedicated support to the Marines and Army troops cut off by the huge infusion of Chinese troops supporting North Korea.  "This was the supreme test for the Marine doctrine of close air support, for the ferocity of the enemy assault and the hazards of winter operations in mountain country required not only maximum effort, but constant improvisation." [Kenneth Condit, Ernest Giusti, Marine Corps Gazette 7/52]    Praise for the Death Rattlers and their Corsairs continue to be voiced even today when Chosin Reservoir is mentioned.  
    The ubiquitous presence of VMF-323 planes not only protected troops cut off from supply lines, reinforcements, and safety, they prevented enemy troops from massing for attack and they helped open the way for, and then protect our troops' on their breakout ("attacking in another direction") from the Chosin Reservoir through the mountains and to the safety of Hungnam on the coast.  More than once, they were under such fierce attack that when the Corsairs radioed that they had to leave the area because they were out of ordnance, the forward air controller yelled into the radio to make dummy runs until the next planes arrived.  The Corsair pilots made low strafing-type passes keeping the enemy low and ineffective.
    On 7 Dec, Technical Sergeant Hugh F Newell, one of the squadron's Naval Aviation Pilots (NAP) was killed during a strafing run against enemy emplacements near Hagaru-ri when his Corsair was hit by enemy antiaircraft fire.  "Whiskey" Newell, as his fellow squadron buddies called him, was considered to be one of the best fighter and acrobatic pilots in the Marine Corps.  Earlier in the month, another NAP, Tech Sergeant George Welker was forced to make a [successful] wheels-up landing at Hagaru-ri airstrip after his plane was struck by antiaircraft fire.
    By 13 Dec, the last of the 1st Marine Division arrived at Hangnam and the fighting breakout was complete.  Marine aviation had been so effective in protecting the ground troops that two regimental commanders redeployed during the day in order to have the Corsairs overhead.  Commanding General of 1st Division, Oliver P Smith said,  "During the long reaches of the night and in the snow storms many a Marine prayed for the coming day or clearing weather when he knew he would again hear the welcome roar of your planes as they dealt out destruction to the enemy... Never in its history has Marine aviation given more convincing proof of its indispensable value to the ground Marine."
    On 26 Dec 1950, the Badoeng Strait was again heading for waters west of Inchon.  From there, CAPs, armed recon, and CAS for the US 8th Army north of Seoul; and armed recon along roads leading south of Pyongyang and Chinnanpo; and up as far as the Yalu River kept the Death Rattlers busy until the middle of January, 1951.  At that time, VMF-323 moved with, and under the command of MAG-33 to Bofu Airbase on Honshu Island, Japan.  Just prior to the move, Major Stanley S. Nicolay relieved Major Arnold A. Lund as commanding officer of the squadron.  Missions from Bofu were difficult as only 5 minutes on-target time was left due to long distances traveled.

   On 8 Feb, the squadron moved to K-1 airfield near Pusan and flew 16 missions in support of US 8th Army the same day!  Inchon and Kimpo were re-taken.  The squadron was living in tents, had no furniture, and was eating K-Rations in freezing weather.
    On 11 Feb VMF-323 got 12 pilots and 45 enlisted men as replacements, so the first of the original compliment of Death Rattlers in Korea started home.  In March, the squadron was transferred officially to MAG-12 and flew mostly armed recon.  On 1 March 1st Lt Raleigh E Barton was killed when his plane was shot down while his flight leader, Capt William E. Brown, was completing a strafing run.  2nd Lt John T Fitzgerald was killed 14 March when his Corsair was shot down near ChunChon.
    14 March, UN Forces re-took Seoul.  Captain Paul L Martelli was forced to bail out of his stricken aircraft on 3 April.  He survived POW camp to come home.  The same day, Tech Sergeant Robert H Bentley also had to bail out, but he was safely picked up by a helicopter.  On 9 April, 1st Lt Lilburn L Harpe was shot down and also successfully recovered.
    11 April 1951 President Truman fired General Douglas MacArthur and replaced him with General Matthew Ridgeway, who had recently been placed in command of the 8th Army.  Now, Ridgeway took charge of the whole Korean War.
    2nd Lt James A Gleaves Jr was shot down in enemy territory near Kwangdong-ni on 14 April.  A rescue helicopter was repulsed by enemy fire; Lt Gleaves was later listed as KIA.  On 20 April, the Death Rattlers also began to use K-16, an airfield closer to the action near Seoul, as a rearming and refueling point - until they had to return to K-1 for repair or scheduled maintenance.  K-16 was a difficult base of operations because it did not have a hard surface runway and heavily loaded aircraft would often get stuck in the sand.  The advantage of proximity, however, kept 323 using it.
    21 April, the Chinese started a spring offensive.  On 27 April, 1st Lt Earl F Patrick was killed during an armed recon flight.  3 days later, 1st Lt James L Frazier died after his plane was hit by enemy ground fire and crashed on a mountain ridge.  On 2 May, Capt Byron H Beswick was downed by small arms fire while leading a flight attacking 500 enemy troops.  1st Lt Neal R Ewing had remained on station over Beswick until darkness forced him to return to base.  Beswick was captured, but did survive the war.  On 18 May, Lt Ewing became a casualty himself after his CAS mission was diverted to cover a downed pilot.  Ewing and 2nd Lt Bruce Clingan circled the downed pilot until they were vectored west along the Choyang River where Lt Ewing's napalm tank was hit by ground fire.  His plane crashed into a ridge and burned on impact.
    By June, both sides had "dug in" but on 2 June the squadron moved its base of operations from K-1 to Itami to prepare for embarkation on board the USS Sicily (CVE-118).  From the deck of the Sicily, the Death Rattlers began flying naval gunfire spotting; CAS; armed recon; and CAP, in support of an ongoing blockade of the NE coast of Korea as the Crunchers (Ground Troops) were moving into the "Punchbowl."  On 17 June, Captain Bieglow Watts Jr. was killed when his plane crashed into the sea, broke apart and sank during an attempted landing on the Sicily.  
    20 June, UN Command stopped the Allied offensive as peace negotiations began at Panmunjom.  CAS  flights were now flown only on orders from Air Force/Army combined higher authority.  For the next 3 months, the primary mission of the squadron continued to be the blockade - now including the NW coast as well.  The blockade was supported by 2 aircraft carriers, the Sicily and the British HMS Glory.  In Aug, the squadron flew 1,452 combat hours.  
    On 20 Sep, the Death Rattlers left the Sicily for a short stay at Itami before setting up operations again at K-1.  The 1st month of operations at K-1 was record breaking, flying 2,767 combat hours.  On 10 Oct they flew two 20 plane strikes against vital equipment depots in Mulgae-ri.  On 30 Oct, VMF-323 moved to K-18 near Kangnung, MAG-12's new airfield.  One of the ships carrying squadron materiel ran aground on a sand bar and remained immobilized for 6 days, but only one day of air operations was lost during the move, and that was from inclement weather.
    Aircrew losses were high during Oct.  Capt Emanuel R Amann was lost in an attack on an enemy rail line on 4 Oct.  3 days later, 2nd Lt Arthur D DeLacy was reported MIA after he bailed out of his Corsair after it took antiaircraft hit.  The helicopter rescue failed due to intense ground fire and Lt. DeLacy was confirmed as a POW by 1st MAW intelligence 11 Oct.   Captain Cornelius T Montgomery was killed 10 Oct when his aircraft was hit by antiaircraft fire as he dove on a target in Mulgae-ri.  He radioed that he would bail out, but no parachute was seen.  On 30 Oct 1st Lt Herman F Stanfill was listed as MIA after his plane was hit by ground fire during a CAS mission.  He bailed out behind enemy lines; an attempted rescue by helicopter was repulsed by ground fire; and later reports listed Stanfill as a POW.
    During Nov & Dec, CAS missions declined as interdiction missions aimed at the destruction of railroad operations increased.  On these "rail-cut" missions, each Corsair usually carried a 1,000# GP and 6-100# GPs equipped with variable time fuses to be used for flak suppression; and an external fuel tank for longer time over target.  An additional Corsair was added to each rail-cutting mission carrying a drop tank containing survival equipment for any pilot forced down in enemy territory. In Dec, the Death Rattlers lost Capt Herbert D Smith, last seen after his plane was hit by a 90mm projectile during an attack on a rail line.  
    During 1952, under LtCol Richard L Blume from 16 Jan to 25 April; and LtCol Henry S Miller from 1 June to 31 Aug; VMF-323 continued rail-cutting and CAS from K-18.  Col Miller recalled, "In my days in VMF-451 in Willow Grove, we had a superb enlisted engineering chief named Andrew Marushok.   Andy and I always had a firm and clear understanding:  He was to maintain aircraft availability at the highest possible percentage, and I was to see that every aircraft was flown as much as possible.  When I reported to 323 in 1952, who should be the EO but Lt Marushok!  We were delighted to see each other, and it was pure joy to work with him."  VMF/A-323's flight support crews were always the best.  The mutual admiration between the two groups kept each challenged at peak performance levels (and made for some great sports teams!)
    In 1952, the squadron's 24 aircraft complement was changed to include approximately half F4U-4Bs and half AU-1s.  The AU-1 was similar to the F4Us but optimized for the attack role.  It was strictly a low altitude aircraft with a 2-speed supercharger, versus the 2-stage, 2-speed supercharger in the F4U.  It had more power at the lower altitudes but was a "dog" up high(!) and routinely carried an extra 500 pounds of ordnance.
    The most unique, and disliked, flight missions were the RES-CAPs.   Whenever there were large-scale combined strikes or any significant air activity north of the bomb line, it was customary for the 5th Air Force to assign a 4-plane "Rescue" Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP) on station near the activity, but orbiting off the coast.  In the event a pilot was downed, the RESCAP was vectored to the scene to locate the pilot and hold off enemy troops until a rescue helicopter could get there.  The F4Us of VMA-323 were the prime recipients of this mission because they had four 20mm cannons for strafing, long endurance, and maneuverability best suited for the task.  They were usually long, dull flights, boring holes in the sky around an orbit point, while the pilots tried to ignore their frozen feet - because the F4U had very inadequate cockpit heaters.  Infrequently, the freezing boredom would become intense activity dodging enemy flak while covering a downed pilot.  Since that was not an approved toe defroster, the 1st Marine Division donated some "Cruncher" thermo boots.  Although a little awkward on the rudder pedals, they helped make most of those RESCAPs just boring and not freezing!
    CAPs flown by the squadron consisted of 2 aircraft.  Because the squadron's primary mission was to enforce the blockade, at least one and often 2 daily recon flights sought out enemy shipping along the coast.  Land recon missions also were flown over main routes of supply and communications in NW Korea.  MPQ radar bombing was flown if cloud cover precluded direct air support; aircraft were vectored on a prescribed course and direct triggering of the bombs ordered at the correct release point.  
    On 21 April the squadron moved to a new base of operations, K-6 near Pyongtaeng-ni. The majority of K-6 missions were CAS in support of the 1st Marine Division.  There were also regular squadron-sized attack missions against enemy supply dumps, troop concentrations, storage areas, etc. north of the bomb line. On 30 June the squadron was redesignated Marine Attack
Squadron 323 (VMA-323) reflecting its change in mission.  The Death Rattlers continued operations from K-6 under LtCol Willard C Lemke, commanding officer from 20 Nov 1952 to 12 Jan 1953; and LtCol William M Frash, from 13 Jan to 10 April.  LtCol Frash said, "During the Korean Defense and Winter Campaign of 1952-3, the squadron was flying daily in physically difficult (cold) conditions, carrying bomb loads of 6,200 pounds... off a 4,200' strip of PSP (pierced steel planking) against well dug-in and prepared enemy positions.  These were not dramatic operations but were just hard-slugging flying against intense antiaircraft fire most of the time,"  11 Apr to 26 Jun, LtCol Clarence Moore was CO; and 27 Jun to 5 Jul Maj Robert C Woten commanded the squadron's winding up of Korean operations.
    2 July 1953 was the Death Rattlers' last day of combat flying in Korea.   The squadron left Korea under the command of Capt Ted J. Foster with 5 enlisted men for Itami soon after, then on to Atsugi NAS near Tokyo for transportation back to the States.  Before leaving Korea, VMA-323 distributed its aircraft and material allowance to other units of the 1st MAW who would be remaining in the Far East.  Most 323 personnel were sent on leave with orders reassigning them to a variety of duty stations upon their arrival in the States.  13 July 1953, what was left of the squadron arrived at NAS Moffett Field and preceded to MCAS El Toro where LtCol William Watkins relieved Capt Foster as commanding officer and VMA-323 became part of MAG-15.
    VMF/VMA-323 was the Marine fixed-wing fighter/attack squadron with the longest overseas service in the Korean War, accumulating 48,677 flight hours.  The commitment in Korea had ended, as the Death Rattlers added to its already proud history and closed a 2nd chapter in combat.   With 16 Death Rattlers Killed In Action (the same amount of losses as in WW II) and 4 POWs, it was costly.  The Jet Age was at hand..

NOTE:
    After the Chosin Reservoir, in 1951, the Air Force's "single air-management" doctrine took over... breaking up the Marine air-ground teams.  USAF 5th Air Force took control of land-based 1st MAW for the remainder of the Korean conflict.  They emphasized deep interdiction strikes - not close air support for ground troops.  Every commander of 1st Division Marines filed formal complaints about quality, quantity and timeliness of air support, however, no satisfactory compromise was made.
    The Marines felt quality, quantity and speed of air support suffered almost to the point of becoming nonexistent.  Newly achieved co-equal status on the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Marine Corps with the Army, Navy & Air Force provided in January 1951 legislation in Congress notwithstanding, the Marine Corps carried out, as it must, orders from the existing chain of command.  It was hoped that in the clear-headed reason of peace time, the command structure of the various services would bring back the valuably successful, tactically effective and life-saving doctrine of air-ground teams so ably demonstrated by the VMF-323 Death Rattlers in the Korean War.  (Another sad note is that the same “single air-management” doctrine took over in Vietnam).

Have some pictures of 323 in Korea just lying around, send them to us and we will put them on this page.  Got some great Sea-Stories, email them to us and we will feature them on our Honor Roll page.

E-mail